Section 101 defines murder as culpable homicide meeting one of four alternative conditions — intention to cause death; intention to cause bodily injury the offender knows likely to cause death; intention to cause bodily injury objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or knowledge that an act is so imminently dangerous it must in all probability cause death, done without excuse. Five Exceptions then carve out situations where culpable homicide, though it fits one of these conditions, is not murder: grave and sudden provocation, exceeding the right of private defence in good faith, a public servant exceeding lawful powers in good faith, a sudden fight without premeditation, and consent of a person above eighteen years to their own death or risk of death.
Verified against the National Crime Records Bureau's official BNS–IPC concordance (Sankalan Portal), which maps Section 101 to old IPC Section 300, and cross-checked directly against the bare text of both Acts.
| BNS section | IPC, 1860 equivalent | Category |
|---|---|---|
| 101 | 300 | Substantively changed |
Comparing the two texts word for word, four differences were found. First, the four main conditions defining murder are presented as lettered clauses (a)–(d) in the BNS, where the old IPC used the ordinal labels "1stly," "2ndly," "3rdly," and "4thly" — a presentational change only, with the substantive content of each condition unchanged. Second, Exception 1's three provisos, presented in the old IPC as a separate paragraph introduced by "The above exception is subject to the following provisos:— First.—...Secondly.—...Thirdly.—...", are restructured in the BNS into a single "Provided that the provocation is not,––" clause with lettered sub-provisos (a), (b), (c) — again a structural rewording, with the same three substantive conditions preserved. Third, Exception 5's statutory illustration describes the person incapable of consenting to death as "a child" in the BNS, where the old IPC described the same person as "a person under eighteen years of age" — a wording change in the illustration text itself. Fourth, in three of the illustrations to Exception 1 the word "inasmuch" is spelled "in as much" — a spelling change only, with no change of meaning.
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder,––
(a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or
(b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or
(c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or
(d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Illustrations.
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.
Exception 1.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident:
Provided that the provocation is not,––
(a) sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person;
(b) given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant;
(c) given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Illustrations.
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z's child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.
(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A's deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.
(e) A attempts to pull Z's nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was giving by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B's rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B's hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Illustration.
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.
Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.
Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
Illustration.
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a child to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z's youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.
Source: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), as published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary.
Clause (a) is the most direct route to murder: an act done by which death is caused, with the actual intention that death result. Where this intention is proved, the offence is murder without needing to examine the remaining clauses.
Clause (b) covers a case where the offender did not necessarily intend death itself, but intended to cause a bodily injury which the offender specifically knew, given the particular victim's circumstances, was likely to cause that victim's death. This clause turns on the offender's own subjective knowledge about the specific victim, not an objective, general standard.
Clause (c) shifts from the offender's subjective knowledge to an objective standard: the offender intended to cause a bodily injury, and that injury, viewed objectively, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Here it does not matter whether the offender personally believed the injury would be fatal, or even intended death at all — what matters is that the injury intended was, by its own nature, sufficient to kill.
Clause (d) covers reckless conduct directed at no one in particular: the offender knows the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or a likely-fatal injury, and commits the act anyway without any excuse for taking that risk. Unlike clauses (a)-(c), this clause does not require intent toward any specific victim — extreme, unexcused recklessness towards whoever might be harmed is enough.
Exception 1 reduces murder to culpable homicide where the offender, deprived of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, kills the provoker, or kills someone else by mistake or accident in the process. The exception does not apply where the provocation was sought or voluntarily invited by the offender as an excuse to harm someone, where it was given by a lawful act or a public servant's lawful exercise of power, or where it was given by a lawful exercise of private defence. Whether provocation was grave and sudden enough is a question of fact in each case.
Exception 2 applies where the offender was genuinely exercising the right of private defence of person or property in good faith, but exceeded the power the law allows, causing death without premeditation and without intending more harm than the defence required. It protects a person who overreacts in a real defensive situation, as distinct from someone acting with a defensive pretext.
Exception 3 applies to a public servant, or someone aiding a public servant, acting to advance public justice, who exceeds the powers the law gives, causing death by an act believed in good faith to be lawful and necessary for the discharge of official duty, without ill-will toward the person killed. Good faith and the absence of ill-will are essential to the exception.
Exception 4 applies where death is caused without premeditation, in a sudden fight arising from a sudden quarrel, in the heat of passion, and without the offender taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. The Explanation clarifies it is immaterial which side started the provocation or struck first — the focus is on the suddenness and mutual, unplanned nature of the fight.
Exception 5 applies where the person whose death is caused, being above eighteen years of age, suffers death or takes the risk of death with their own consent. Because a child cannot give this kind of consent, the statutory illustration makes clear that instigating a child to commit suicide is not covered by this exception at all — it instead amounts to abetting murder.
These judgment(s) relate to Section 101 as a whole rather than to one specific sub-section, and so are presented together here rather than alongside a particular clause above.
Two men died after a fight that broke out near the accused's house, arising from prior enmity between the families. The Supreme Court converted the murder conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, holding that Exception 4 (Section 101's fourth exception) applies where all four elements are present together: no premeditation, a sudden fight, the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and no undue advantage taken or cruel/unusual conduct. Here, the weapons used (an ordinary stick, and the blunt rather than sharp side of an axe) and the absence of any planning pointed away from premeditated murder and toward this exception.
Currency check: decided March 2025; no overruling found in this review.
The accused thrust a spear into the deceased's abdomen; the injury was medically sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, but the trial judge found the accused intended only grievous hurt, not death. The Supreme Court upheld the murder conviction, laying down the now-foundational four-part test for Section 101(c) (old Section 300, 3rdly): once it is objectively shown that a bodily injury of a particular kind was present, was intended (as opposed to accidental), and was, objectively, sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the offence is murder — regardless of whether the accused subjectively believed or intended that the injury would actually kill.
Currency check: decided 1958; still the unqualified, foundational authority on this limb of murder, cited and applied without modification in every generation of cases since. No overruling or reformulation found in this review.
The accused, provoked by abuse and a slap from an intoxicated victim during a sudden quarrel, picked up a stone lying nearby and struck a fatal blow. The trial court and High Court gave him the benefit of Exception 1 (grave and sudden provocation) and convicted him only under Section 304 Part I. On appeal, the Supreme Court set out the full six-part test for Exception 1 (grave and sudden provocation depriving the offender of self-control, causing death of the provoker or another by mistake, within the continuance of that loss of control) and cautioned that not every provocation qualifies — it must be both grave and sudden together, and the accused's response must bear a reasonable relationship to it. The Court itself doubted whether mere abuse and a slap met that bar, but since the State had not appealed the point, it did not disturb the conviction — it only reduced the sentence to time served given the case's age.
Currency check: decided January 2025; no overruling found in this review.
No. Culpable homicide is murder only if it meets one of the four conditions in clauses (a) through (d), and even then, only if none of the five Exceptions apply. Culpable homicide that does not meet these conditions, or that falls within an Exception, is punished separately as culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Only in the specific circumstances of Exception 2 — where the right of private defence was being exercised in good faith but was exceeded, without premeditation and without intending more harm than the defence required. A defence that stays within the bounds the law allows is not an offence at all, and would be addressed under the Sanhita's general exceptions rather than this section.
No. Exception 5 applies only to a person above the age of eighteen years. The section's own illustration confirms that instigating a child to commit suicide is not covered by this exception, and instead amounts to abetting murder.