Section 126 defines "wrongful restraint" as voluntarily obstructing a person from proceeding in a direction they have a right to proceed in, subject to a good-faith exception for obstructing a private way, and separately punishes wrongful restraint with simple imprisonment or fine.
Verified against the National Crime Records Bureau's official BNS–IPC concordance (Sankalan Portal), which flags Section 126 overall as containing a change, mapping sub-section (1) to old IPC Section 339 and sub-section (2) to old IPC Section 341, and cross-checked directly against the bare text of both provisions.
| BNS section | IPC, 1860 equivalent | Category |
|---|---|---|
| 126(1) | 339 | Exact |
| 126(2) | 341 | Substantively changed |
Comparing the texts word for word: sub-section (1), its Exception, and its Illustration are reproduced without any substantive change from old IPC Section 339. Sub-section (2)'s conduct description is unchanged from old IPC Section 341, but the maximum fine has increased from five hundred rupees to five thousand rupees.
(1) Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.
Illustration.
A obstructs a path along which Z has a right to pass, A not believing in good faith that he has a right to stop the path. Z is thereby prevented from passing. A wrongfully restrains Z.
(2) Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
Source: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), as published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary.
This sub-section defines wrongful restraint as voluntarily obstructing a person from proceeding in a direction they have a right to proceed in. The Exception carves out a good-faith belief in a lawful right to obstruct a private way over land or water; where that good-faith belief is absent, the Exception does not apply, as the statutory illustration itself shows.
This sub-section punishes wrongful restraint as defined in sub-section (1), with simple imprisonment up to one month, or fine up to five thousand rupees, or both.
These judgment(s) relate to Section 126 as a whole rather than to one specific sub-section, and so are presented together here rather than alongside a particular clause above.
This is a boundary-marking case, not one where a restraint conviction was upheld. At a dinner party, a senior police officer allegedly blocked a woman IAS officer's path so that she had to step backward. The Supreme Court held that this bare allegation — standing in someone's way so they must move back — does not, by itself, satisfy Section 126's requirement of voluntarily obstructing a person so as to prevent them proceeding in a direction they have a right to go. (The Court did find the same conduct made out separate offences of outraging modesty and insult to modesty, which is a different part of the case, not reproduced here.) For this section, the value of the case is negative but precise: it shows the line between an incidental, momentary blocking and an actual prevention-of-movement sufficient to constitute wrongful restraint.
Currency check: decided October 1995, still cited as authority on the scope of wrongful restraint under Section 339/341 IPC (→ Section 126 BNS); no overruling found in this review.
Wrongful restraint under this section involves preventing a person from proceeding in a particular direction, while wrongful confinement (Section 127) involves preventing a person from moving beyond certain circumscribed limits altogether. Wrongful confinement is a more serious form of restriction.
No. The Exception applies only where the person obstructing genuinely, in good faith, believes they have a lawful right to obstruct. Where that good-faith belief is absent, as the statutory illustration itself shows, the Exception does not apply.
Yes. Per the BNSS First Schedule, it is cognizable and bailable, triable by any Magistrate.