Section 19 provides that an act is not an offence merely because it is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, so long as it is done without any criminal intention to cause that harm, and in good faith to prevent or avoid other harm to a person or property — whether the risk was justified is itself a question of fact, turning on how serious and how imminent the harm being avoided actually was.
Verified against the National Crime Records Bureau's official BNS–IPC concordance (Sankalan Portal) and cross-checked directly against the bare text of both Acts. Section 19 is marked Exact correspondence:
| BNS 19 | Covers | IPC, 1860 equivalent | Category |
|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm | S.81 (same rule, Explanation, and two illustrations) | Exact |
Comparing the bare text directly, BNS Section 19 reproduces old IPC Section 81's rule, its own built-in Explanation, and both illustrations without substantive change. The only textual differences found are in illustration (a): the BNS version refers to the captain of “a vessel,” where the IPC version said “a steam vessel”; it ends “running down the boat C” where the IPC version ends “running down C”; and it reads “by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect” where the IPC text, as printed in the source used for this comparison, reads “by doing an which he knew was likely to cause that effect” (the word “act” is absent there). None of these changes the rule or the outcome of the illustration.
Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.
Explanation.—It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.
Illustrations.
(a) A, the captain of a vessel, suddenly and without any fault or negligence on his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a boat B, with twenty or thirty passengers on board, unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that, by changing his course, he must incur risk of running down a boat C with only two passengers on board, which he may possibly clear. Here, if A alters his course without any intention to run down the boat C and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run down the boat C by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down the boat C.
(b) A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from spreading. He does this with the intention in good faith of saving human life or property. Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as to excuse A’s act, A is not guilty of the offence.
Source: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), as published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary.
This section addresses a situation distinct from Section 18: here, the person knows in advance that the act carries a real risk of causing harm, rather than the harm arising from a genuine accident. What removes criminal liability is not ignorance of the risk, but the combination of two things: the absence of any criminal intention to actually cause the harm, and good faith action aimed at preventing or avoiding some other, competing harm to a person or property. The section's own built-in Explanation makes clear this is not a blank cheque — whether the risk taken was actually justified is a question of fact in every case, turning on how serious and how imminent the harm being avoided genuinely was. A trivial or speculative harm being avoided will not excuse a serious and certain risk knowingly created; the more severe and more imminent the harm avoided, the more readily a comparable risk taken to avoid it will be excused. This is, in effect, a necessity-style defence: it permits choosing the lesser of two evils, provided the choice is made honestly and the comparison genuinely favours the course taken.
Section 18 (genuine accident) is the more fitting provision where the harm was unforeseen. Section 19 specifically addresses a situation where the harm was foreseen but knowingly risked in good faith to prevent a different harm.
No. Whether the risk was justified is a question of fact, depending on how serious and how imminent the harm being prevented or avoided actually was, compared to the risk taken.
The act is not an offence at all — it is a complete defence, not merely a factor reducing punishment.