Section 2 fixes the meaning of the key words and phrases used throughout the BNS — terms like “document,” “public servant,” “dishonestly,” and “voluntarily” all take their meaning from here. Getting a definition wrong here can change how an entire offence elsewhere in the Sanhita is read, so this section is worth understanding on its own before reading any specific offence.
Verified against the National Crime Records Bureau's official BNS–IPC concordance (Sankalan Portal). Section 2 as a whole is marked Substantively changed relative to the old Indian Penal Code, 1860 (its definitions were spread across many separate sections, not one). Clause-by-clause:
| BNS 2(x) | Term | IPC, 1860 equivalent | Category |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | “act” | S.33 “Act”. “Omission” | Split |
| (25) | “omission” | ||
| (2) | “animal” | S.47 “Animal” | Exact |
| (3) | “child” | — none — | No predecessor |
| (4) | “counterfeit” | S.28 “Counterfeit” | Exact |
| (5) | “Court” | S.20 “Court of Justice” | Exact |
| (6) | “death” | S.46 “Death” | Exact |
| (7) | “dishonestly” | S.24 “Dishonestly” | Exact |
| (8) | “document” | S.29 “Document” + S.29A “Electronic record” (S.29A deleted as a standalone provision, folded into this clause) | Substantively changed |
| (9) | “fraudulently” | S.25 “Fraudulently” | Exact |
| (10) | “gender” | S.8 “Gender” | Substantively changed |
| (11) | “good faith” | S.52 “Good faith” | Exact |
| (12) | “Government” | S.17 “Government” | Exact |
| (13) | “harbour” | S.52A “Harbour” | Exact |
| (14) | “injury” | S.44 “Injury” | Exact |
| (15) | “illegal” / “legally bound to do” | S.43 | Exact |
| (16) | “Judge” | S.19 “Judge” | Exact |
| (17) | “life” | S.45 “Life” | Exact |
| (18) | “local law” | S.42 “Local law” | Exact |
| (19) | “man” | S.10 “Man”. “Woman” | Split |
| (35) | “woman” | ||
| (20) | “month” / “year” | S.49 “Year”. “Month” | Exact |
| (21) | “movable property” | S.22 | Substantively changed |
| (22) | “number” | S.9 “Number” | Exact |
| (23) | “oath” | S.51 “Oath” | Exact |
| (24) | “offence” | S.40 “Offence” | Exact |
| (26) | “person” | S.11 “Person” | Exact |
| (27) | “public” | S.12 “Public” | Exact |
| (28) | “public servant” | S.21 “Public servant” | Exact |
| (29) | “reason to believe” | S.26 | Exact |
| (30) | “special law” | S.41 “Special law” | Exact |
| (31) | “valuable security” | S.30 “Valuable security” | Exact |
| (32) | “vessel” | S.48 “Vessel” | Exact |
| (33) | “voluntarily” | S.39 “Voluntarily” | Exact |
| (34) | “will” | S.31 “A will” | Exact |
| (36) | “wrongful gain” | S.23 “Wrongful gain” | Exact |
| (37) | “wrongful loss” | S.23 “Wrongful loss” | Exact |
| (38) | “gaining wrongfully” / “losing wrongfully” | S.23 | Exact |
| (39) | residuary — undefined terms take meaning from IT Act, 2000 / BNSS, 2023 | — none — | No predecessor |
2. In this Sanhita, unless the context otherwise requires,––
(1) “act” denotes as well a series of acts as a single act;
(2) “animal” means any living creature, other than a human being;
(3) “child” means any person below the age of eighteen years;
(4) “counterfeit”.––A person is said to “counterfeit” who causes one thing to resemble another thing, intending by means of that resemblance to practise deception, or knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised.
Explanation 1.—It is not essential to counterfeiting that the imitation should be exact.
Explanation 2.—When a person causes one thing to resemble another thing, and the resemblance is such that a person might be deceived thereby, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the person so causing the one thing to resemble the other thing intended by means of that resemblance to practise deception or knew it to be likely that deception would thereby be practised;
(5) “Court” means a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially;
(6) “death” means the death of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context;
(7) “dishonestly” means doing anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person;
(8) “document” means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, and includes electronic and digital record, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.
Explanation 1.—It is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the letters, figures or marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used in a Court or not.
Illustrations.
(a) A writing expressing the terms of a contract, which may be used as evidence of the contract, is a document.
(b) A cheque upon a banker is a document.
(c) A power-of-attorney is a document.
(d) A map or plan which is intended to be used or which may be used as evidence, is a document.
(e) A writing containing directions or instructions is a document.
Explanation 2.—Whatever is expressed by means of letters, figures or marks as explained by mercantile or other usage, shall be deemed to be expressed by such letters, figures or marks within the meaning of this section, although the same may not be actually expressed.
Illustration.
A writes his name on the back of a bill of exchange payable to his order. The meaning of the endorsement, as explained by mercantile usage, is that the bill is to be paid to the holder. The endorsement is a document, and shall be construed in the same manner as if the words “pay to the holder” or words to that effect had been written over the signature;
(9) “fraudulently” means doing anything with the intention to defraud but not otherwise;
(10) “gender”.—The pronoun “he” and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male, female or transgender.
Explanation.–– “transgender” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (k) of section 2 of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 (40 of 2019);
(11) “good faith”.—Nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is done or believed without due care and attention;
(12) “Government” means the Central Government or a State Government;
(13) “harbour” includes supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or means of conveyance, or the assisting a person by any means, whether of the same kind as those enumerated in this clause or not, to evade apprehension;
(14) “injury” means any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property;
(15) “illegal” and “legally bound to do”.—The word “illegal” is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be “legally bound to do” whatever it is illegal in him to omit;
(16) “Judge” means a person who is officially designated as a Judge and includes a person,––
(i) who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or
(ii) who is one of a body or persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment.
Illustration.
A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power to sentence to fine or imprisonment, with or without appeal, is a Judge;
(17) “life” means the life of a human being, unless the contrary appears from the context;
(18) “local law” means a law applicable only to a particular part of India;
(19) “man” means male human being of any age;
(20) “month” and “year”.––Wherever the word “month” or the word “year” is used, it is to be understood that the month or the year is to be reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar;
(21) “movable property” includes property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth;
(22) “number”.—Unless the contrary appears from the context, words importing the singular number include the plural number, and words importing the plural number include the singular number;
(23) “oath” includes a solemn affirmation substituted by law for an oath, and any declaration required or authorised by law to be made before a public servant or to be used for the purpose of proof, whether in a Court or not;
(24) “offence”.—Except in the Chapters and sections mentioned in sub-clauses (a) and (b), the word “offence” means a thing made punishable by this Sanhita, but––
(a) in Chapter III and in the following sections, namely, sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 8, sections 9, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 119, 120, 123, sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 127, 222, 230, 231, 240, 248, 250, 251, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, sub-sections (6) and (7) of section 308 and sub-section (2) of section 330, the word “offence” means a thing punishable under this Sanhita, or under any special law or local law; and
(b) in sub-section (1) of section 189, sections 211, 212, 238, 239, 249, 253 and sub-section (1) of section 329, the word “offence” shall have the same meaning when the act punishable under the special law or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months or more, whether with or without fine;
(25) “omission” denotes as well as a series of omissions as a single omission;
(26) “person” includes any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not;
(27) “public” includes any class of the public or any community;
(28) “public servant” means a person falling under any of the descriptions, namely:—
(a) every commissioned officer in the Army, Navy or Air Force;
(b) every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions;
(c) every officer of a Court including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court, and every person specially authorised by a Court to perform any of such duties;
(d) every assessor or member of a panchayat assisting a Court or public servant;
(e) every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by any Court, or by any other competent public authority;
(f) every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement;
(g) every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience;
(h) every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of the Government, or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of the Government, or to execute any revenue-process, or to investigate, or to report, on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of the Government, or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of the Government, or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of the Government;
(i) every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district;
(j) every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election;
(k) every person—
(i) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government;
(ii) in the service or pay of a local authority as defined in clause (31) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a corporation established by or under a Central or State Act or a Government company as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013).
Explanation.—
(a) persons falling under any of the descriptions made in this clause are public servants, whether appointed by the Government or not;
(b) every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation is a public servant;
(c) “election” means an election for the purpose of selecting members of any legislative, municipal or other public authority, of whatever character, the method of selection to which is by, or under any law for the time being in force.
Illustration.
A Municipal Commissioner is a public servant;
(29) “reason to believe”.—A person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise;
(30) “special law” means a law applicable to a particular subject;
(31) “valuable security” means a document which is, or purports to be, a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or whereby any person acknowledges that he lies under legal liability, or has not a certain legal right.
Illustration.
A writes his name on the back of a bill of exchange. As the effect of this endorsement is to transfer the right to the bill to any person who may become the lawful holder of it, the endorsement is a “valuable security”;
(32) “vessel” means anything made for the conveyance by water of human beings or of property;
(33) “voluntarily”.—A person is said to cause an effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.
Illustration.
A sets fire, by night, to an inhabited house in a large town, for the purpose of facilitating a robbery and thus causes the death of a person. Here, A may not have intended to cause death; and may even be sorry that death has been caused by his act; yet, if he knew that he was likely to cause death, he has caused death voluntarily;
(34) “will” means any testamentary document;
(35) “woman” means a female human being of any age;
(36) “wrongful gain” means gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled;
(37) “wrongful loss” means the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled;
(38) “gaining wrongfully” and “losing wrongfully”.—A person is said to gain wrongfully when such person retains wrongfully, as well as when such person acquires wrongfully. A person is said to lose wrongfully when such person is wrongfully kept out of any property, as well as when such person is wrongfully deprived of property; and
(39) words and expressions used but not defined in this Sanhita but defined in the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000) and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act and Sanhita.
This is a scope-widening definition, not a substantive one — it tells the reader that wherever the Sanhita uses the word “act” (for example, in describing what someone did to commit an offence), that word already covers a sequence of connected acts, not only one isolated act. This matters because many offences are, in practice, committed through a course of conduct rather than a single instant — cheating someone over several transactions, or causing an injury through repeated blows, are still “an act” for the purposes of the offence provision, without needing to argue that each individual act in the sequence independently satisfies the definition. Practically, this clause prevents a defence built on splitting a course of conduct into technically separate acts, none of which alone would meet the threshold, to argue the offence itself was never completed.
A simple exclusionary definition — it fixes “animal” to mean every living creature except humans, without further narrowing by species, domestication, or ownership. Its main practical role is to demarcate offences that specifically involve animals from those that involve human beings, so there's no ambiguity about which category of victim a given offence provision is protecting.
Unlike almost every other clause in this section, “child” (any person below eighteen) has no predecessor in the old IPC at all (see the concordance table above). Its addition here reflects that later, purpose-built legislation (juvenile justice and POCSO-type statutes) already fixed eighteen as the standard age threshold, and the BNS is now importing that same threshold directly into the general criminal code rather than leaving “child” undefined for BNS purposes.
The core test has two ingredients: (a) causing one thing to resemble another, and (b) doing so either intending to deceive by means of that resemblance, or knowing deception is a likely result. Both Explanations soften strict-perfection requirements: Explanation 1 confirms the imitation doesn't have to be exact — a rough or partial resemblance is enough if it's still capable of deceiving; Explanation 2 creates a rebuttable presumption of the required mental state whenever the resemblance is close enough that a person plausibly could be deceived by it — shifting the practical burden onto the person who made the resemblance to show they neither intended nor foresaw deception, once a deceptive-quality resemblance is shown. This clause matters for a wide set of forgery- and counterfeit-currency-type offences where the whole wrong lies in creating a false appearance of authenticity.
This defines “Court” functionally, by reference to who is exercising judicial power and when, rather than by naming particular institutions. Two things follow: first, the same person (a Judge) can be a “Court” for BNS purposes while acting judicially, and not a “Court” at other times (for example, while performing an administrative function) — the definition tracks the capacity being exercised, not the office itself. Second, it covers both a single Judge sitting alone and a bench of multiple Judges sitting together, so long as either is acting judicially. This distinction matters for offence provisions that specifically require conduct to occur “in Court” or “before a Court” — whether a given room, proceeding, or moment counts turns on whether judicial power is actually being exercised right then.
A short definition mainly notable for what it excludes by default — “death,” standing alone, refers to a human being's death, not an animal's, unless the surrounding text of a specific provision makes clear a different meaning is intended there. This default matters for offences where causing “death” is itself an ingredient (homicide-type offences), keeping their scope anchored to human victims unless a section says otherwise.
This fixes a mental-state test built entirely around gain/loss framed against a legal-entitlement baseline (as later defined in clauses (36)–(38), wrongful gain/loss) — a person acts “dishonestly” only if their intention is to cause gain to someone not legally entitled to it, or loss to someone who is. Notably, the gain and the loss don't have to be to or from the same two people specifically named in a transaction — the definition only requires the intention to cause wrongful gain to “one person” or wrongful loss to “another,” so either half alone is enough. This drives most property offences (cheating, theft-type provisions) that hinge on dishonest intention rather than mere carelessness or an honest but mistaken claim of right.
The appellant, running an educational institution, was accused of using a forged Fire Department NOC to obtain recognition for his building. The Court held that dishonest inducement — not deception alone — is what clause (7)'s wrongful-gain/wrongful-loss test actually requires. Because the NOC was never legally necessary for the recognition sought (the building's height fell below the regulatory threshold that would have triggered the requirement), the alleged false representation could not have induced anything: the recognition would have been granted either way. Without that causal link between the falsehood and a resulting wrongful gain or loss, the “dishonestly” ingredient fails, however deceptive the underlying act may have looked on its face.
Currency check: decided 10 September 2025; recent enough that no overruling or superseding authority is expected, and none was found in this review.
This is one of the most heavily used definitions in the entire Sanhita — it underpins every forgery, cheating, and fraud offence that turns on a document being false or forged. Note two things the definition does deliberately: first, it is written broadly enough to cover anything that records information “by means of letters, figures or marks” — so it is not limited to paper. Second, it expressly reaches “electronic and digital record,” which is the main substantive change from the old Indian Penal Code, 1860 definition (see the concordance table above) — the IPC's own definition predates routine digital recordkeeping and needed judicial interpretation to stretch it to emails, scanned files, and the like; BNS puts that stretch directly into the statute's own words instead.
Deliberately circular-looking but functionally important: it confirms “fraudulently” is defined by actual intention to defraud, not by broader concepts (deceit, dishonesty, unfairness) that fall short of a genuine intention to defraud someone. Courts have historically distinguished “dishonestly” (clause (7), gain/loss-focused) from “fraudulently” (deception-focused, aimed at inducing someone into some action or state of mind, whether or not property changes hands) — this clause anchors the second concept to its own core idea rather than letting it blur into the first.
Two parties to a decade-old joint venture agreement fell out, and one side filed an FIR alleging cheating and forgery. The Court held that fraudulent or dishonest intent under clause (9) must be present at the very inception of a transaction — not read backward into it once things sour years later. The ten-year gap between the agreement and the FIR was itself telling: a genuinely fraudulent scheme from the outset would ordinarily have surfaced far sooner. Where a dispute is, on the facts, really about one side failing to honour contractual terms, the remedy lies in a civil suit, not a criminal complaint dressed up as one.
Currency check: decided 25 February 2026; very recent, no overruling or superseding authority expected, and none was found in this review.
This is a drafting-convention clause, not a substantive rule — it tells the reader that wherever the Sanhita uses “he,” “his,” or similar, that language is gender-neutral in effect and applies equally regardless of whether the person concerned is male, female, or transgender (the last term carrying the meaning already fixed by the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019). Its purpose is purely interpretive: preventing an argument that a provision written using masculine pronouns doesn't apply to a woman or a transgender person as either offender or victim.
This defines good faith negatively — rather than saying what good faith positively is, it says what defeats it: acting or believing without due care and attention. Practically, this sets an objective, diligence-based standard rather than a purely subjective “I genuinely believed it” standard — a person's belief, however sincerely held, is not “good faith” under the BNS if it was formed carelessly, without making the inquiries or taking the care a reasonable person in that position would have taken.
Homebuyers, frustrated with a builder's unresolved defects, put up a public protest banner listing their grievances. The builder filed a defamation complaint; the question was whether the banner was protected as an imputation “made in good faith.” The Court applied exactly the test clause (11) itself states — due care and attention, not mere honest belief — and found it satisfied on the facts: the language was careful and restrained, no malice was shown, and the appellants had a genuine, previously-raised grievance behind the banner. This shows the due-care test operating in a live dispute: good faith is not assumed from sincerity alone, but it is also not defeated merely because the belief later turns out to be disputed — care taken at the time is what counts.
Currency check: decided 17 April 2025; recent enough that no overruling or superseding authority is expected, and none was found in this review.
A short, purely definitional clause fixing “Government” to mean either the Union executive or a State's own executive — it does not extend to local bodies, statutory corporations, or government companies, each of which is addressed separately elsewhere in the Sanhita where relevant (for instance, within clause (28)'s own public-servant categories). Getting this boundary right matters for offences that specifically turn on property or interests being “of the Government” — a local municipality's own property, for example, is not automatically “Government” property under this clause unless a specific provision extends the meaning further.
An inclusive, deliberately broad definition — it doesn't require a single specific act (like literally hiding someone); any one of several listed forms of practical assistance, or any other means at all, that helps a person evade being caught counts as “harbouring” them. The phrase “whether of the same kind… or not” makes clear the list is illustrative, not exhaustive.
A deliberately wide, umbrella definition covering four distinct categories of harm — physical, mental, reputational, and to property — under one word. The qualifier “illegally caused” is doing real work here: harm that is lawfully caused is not “injury” for BNS purposes, however real the harm is in fact.
Two linked definitions in one clause. “Illegal” is defined broadly across three categories — criminal offences, things prohibited by law generally, and things that would ground a civil action — so “illegal” under the BNS is not limited to conduct that is itself separately punishable. “Legally bound to do” then works as the mirror image: an omission is only made “illegal” where failing to act itself falls into one of those same three categories.
Like “Court” in clause (5), this is a functional rather than a titular definition — it reaches beyond people formally called “Judge” to include anyone (or any body a person is part of) empowered by law to give a judgment that is, or would become, legally definitive, whether or not their official designation uses the word “Judge” at all. The statute's own illustration (a Magistrate with sentencing power) makes the point directly: title matters less than the actual legal power being exercised.
Mirrors clause (6)'s treatment of “death” — “life” defaults to meaning human life specifically, not an animal's, unless a particular provision's own context signals otherwise. This keeps offences that turn on endangering or protecting “life” anchored to human beings by default.
This distinguishes laws of purely regional application from both central legislation and “special laws” (clause (30), laws applicable to a particular subject rather than a particular place). The distinction matters wherever the BNS itself cross-refers to conduct being punishable “under any special law or local law” (as clause (24)'s own “offence” definition does).
A short, age-neutral definition — “man” under the BNS includes a male human being at any age, not only adults, unlike some everyday uses of the word that might imply an adult male specifically. This matters wherever the Sanhita's own text uses “man” or “woman” (clause (35)), so it is clear the definition isn't silently excluding boys.
A calendar-fixing clause resolving what could otherwise be genuine ambiguity in a country where multiple calendar systems are culturally in use — wherever the BNS's own text uses “month” or “year,” those words mean a month or year of the Gregorian calendar specifically, not a lunar, Hijri, or other regional calendar.
An exclusion-based definition — everything counts as “movable property” except two specific categories: land itself, and things attached to or permanently fastened to something attached to the earth. This binary split matters enormously for property offences, and the concordance table above flags this clause as substantively changed from the old law — meaning the boundary itself, not just the wording, shifted, so any old-law judgment interpreting the predecessor definition needs fresh confirmation before being relied on here.
The dispute was whether mobile towers and prefabricated shelters — bolted to the ground for stability — counted as movable or immovable property for excise/CENVAT credit purposes. The Court held they were movable: the attachment was only to keep the equipment stable and “wobble-free,” not to permanently improve the land itself, and the tower could be unbolted, relocated, and resold without damage. This is the same underlying reasoning clause (21) itself applies — mere physical attachment to the earth does not automatically make something immovable; what matters is whether the attachment is for the item's own stable functioning (movable) or for the land's permanent benefit (immovable).
Scope note (read carefully before reusing this citation): this judgment arises under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the Central Excise Act, and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — not under the BNS or the old IPC. No reported decision has yet applied BNS clause (21)'s own wording (which also drops the word “corporeal” that appeared in the old IPC S.22 definition, arguably widening its reach to intangible property, an open question this judgment does not touch). It is cited here as the strongest available Supreme Court authority on the shared “attached to the earth” test that clause (21) itself uses, by analogy across statutes — not as a direct construction of the criminal-law provision.
Currency check: decided 20 November 2024; recent enough that no overruling or superseding authority is expected, and none was found in this review.
A standard drafting-convention clause: the BNS's own use of a singular word should ordinarily be read as covering the plural too, and vice versa, unless a specific provision's context makes clear only one or the other was meant. This avoids technical arguments that a provision written in the singular somehow doesn't reach multiple offenders or multiple victims acting or affected together.
This widens “oath” beyond its literal religious/traditional sense to include the secular “solemn affirmation” alternative the law permits for those who don't wish to swear a religious oath, and further extends it to cover any legally required or authorised declaration made before a public servant or for evidentiary purposes — even where no formal oath-taking ceremony occurs at all.
This clause does two things at once: first, it fixes the baseline meaning of “offence” as a thing made punishable by the BNS itself; second, in sub-clauses (a) and (b), it carves out named exceptions where “offence” is deliberately widened to also include things punishable under a special law or local law — but only for the specific sections listed, and in sub-clause (b) only where the special/local law itself carries a minimum six-month imprisonment penalty. This layered structure exists because several BNS provisions need to reach beyond BNS offences alone to certain other-law offences too, but only in carefully bounded situations.
The mirror image of clause (1)'s treatment of “act” — a continuous or repeated failure to act is still treated as one “omission” for BNS purposes, not as several separate, individually-assessed omissions.
Extends “person” beyond natural human beings to include artificial and unincorporated entities — companies, associations, and any body of persons acting together, whether or not that body has separate legal personality through incorporation.
Widens “public” so that a provision requiring harm or conduct affecting “the public” is satisfied even where only a defined class or a particular community, rather than the public at large, is actually affected.
A long, enumerated definition rather than a single test — it lists categories of people (judges, officers of the court, government officers, election officials, and more) rather than stating one general principle. Practically, this matters most for offences that only apply to public servants or only apply when committed against one (for example, bribery-type offences and offences of obstructing a public servant in the discharge of duty) — whether the specific person involved falls into one of clauses (a) through (k) decides whether that offence is even available on the facts.
The Court was deciding whether a licensed stamp vendor — who earns a discount on stamp papers rather than a government salary — counts as a “public servant” under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It held that the definition must be read widely and purposively, and that it is the nature of the duty being performed, not the mode of appointment or the form the remuneration takes, that decides the question — so a stamp vendor, discharging a public duty and remunerated through a government-fixed discount, does qualify.
Scope note (read carefully before reusing this citation): this judgment construes “public servant” under the Prevention of Corruption Act's own definition clause (Section 2(c)), not BNS clause (28) or old IPC Section 21 directly — the three statutes define the term in overlapping but textually separate clauses. It is cited here as the most recent Supreme Court authority setting out the general interpretive approach (wide/purposive construction; nature-of-duty as the determining test) that courts are likely to apply when construing BNS clause (28) as well, given how closely the three definitions track each other in structure and purpose — but it is persuasive, not a direct construction of BNS's own text.
Currency check: decided 2 May 2025; recent enough that no overruling or superseding authority is expected, and none was found in this review.
Sets an objective sufficiency-of-cause standard rather than a purely subjective one — a person only has “reason to believe” something where there was actually sufficient cause for that belief, not merely because the person claims, in hindsight, that they believed it. This phrase recurs throughout offence provisions as an alternative to actual knowledge or intention, and this clause fixes how demanding that alternative test is.
The subject-matter mirror of clause (18)'s place-based “local law” — a “special law” is defined by being confined to a particular subject, regardless of how widely across India it applies. Both definitions matter together wherever the BNS text refers to “special law or local law” (as clause (24) does).
A “valuable security” is, at its core, a special category of “document” (clause (8)) — specifically, one whose content itself operates on legal rights or liabilities. The phrase “purports to be” is doing real work: even a document that is not actually legally effective for the purpose it claims still counts as a “valuable security” if it purports to have that legal effect.
A purpose-based definition — anything built for carrying people or goods across water counts as a “vessel,” regardless of its size, materials, or method of propulsion.
This defines a state of mind, not a physical action — a person acts “voluntarily” if they either meant to cause the result, or knew (or had reason to believe) at the time that the result was a likely consequence of what they were doing. This is why the statute's own illustration involves someone who did not specifically intend death but is still held to have caused it voluntarily — the test is satisfied by foreseeing the risk, not only by wanting the outcome.
A brief, cross-referencing definition — “will” under the BNS means any document that is testamentary in character, without further restricting its form or the specific legal requirements it must meet to be a valid will under succession law.
The direct counterpart to clause (19)'s “man” — age-neutral, covering a female human being of any age, so that provisions using the word “woman” are not read to silently exclude girls.
Fixes the legal baseline “dishonestly” (clause (7)) is built around — a gain only counts as “wrongful” where two things are both true: it was obtained by unlawful means, and the gaining person had no legal entitlement to the property in question.
The mirror of clause (36) from the loss side — a “wrongful loss” requires both that the loss was caused by unlawful means and that the person losing the property was actually legally entitled to it.
Clarifies that both “wrongful gain” and “wrongful loss” cover two distinct situations each: gaining wrongfully covers both newly acquiring property one has no right to, and wrongfully continuing to retain property one already holds; losing wrongfully covers both being deprived of property one already had, and being kept out of property one was entitled to receive but never actually got.
A residuary incorporation clause — rather than repeating every relevant definition already fixed elsewhere, the BNS simply borrows the meanings the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 already give to any term the BNS itself uses but doesn't separately define. This keeps definitions consistent across India's interlocking digital-evidence and criminal-procedure framework.
Yes. Clause (8) expressly includes “electronic and digital record” within the definition of “document,” so a saved chat message, email, or scanned file can qualify, provided it otherwise meets the definition (something that expresses or describes a matter and is intended to be, or may be, used as evidence of it).
Clause (3) fixes “child” as any person below eighteen for the purposes of this Sanhita generally. A specific offence elsewhere in the BNS can still use a different, narrower age threshold of its own where the offence's own wording says so — this general definition applies unless the specific section states otherwise.
Because the term needs to reach very different kinds of people — judges, army officers, election officials, government employees — who don't share one single unifying job description. Listing categories, as clause (28) does, avoids leaving genuine public servants out simply because they don't fit a single general phrase.