Section 29 makes clear that the consent-based exceptions in Sections 25, 26, and 27 do not extend to an act that is an offence for reasons that have nothing to do with the harm it causes, is intended to cause, or is known to be likely to cause, to the very person who gave the consent (or on whose behalf it was given).
Verified against the National Crime Records Bureau's official BNS–IPC concordance (Sankalan Portal) and cross-checked directly against the bare text of both Acts. Section 29 is marked Exact correspondence:
| BNS 29 | Covers | IPC, 1860 equivalent | Category |
|---|---|---|---|
| 29 | Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused | S.91 (same rule and illustration, renumbered cross-references) | Exact |
Comparing the bare text directly, BNS Section 29 reproduces old IPC Section 91's rule and illustration without substantive change. The only difference of substance is that the internal cross-references have been renumbered to match the BNS's own numbering: IPC Section 91 referred to “sections 87, 88 and 89,” while BNS Section 29 refers to “sections 25, 26 and 27” — the same three provisions, cited under their new section numbers. The IPC text also reads “inexpediently” where the BNS text reads “independently.”
The exceptions in sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given.
Illustration.
Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence “by reason of such harm”; and the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.
Source: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), as published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary.
Sections 25, 26, and 27 all excuse an act "by reason of" the harm it causes to a consenting person — that is, they remove liability that would otherwise arise specifically because of that harm. This section clarifies an important boundary on that principle: where the very same act is defined as an offence for some entirely separate reason, unrelated to the harm it causes to the consenting person, the consent-based exceptions do not touch that separate basis for liability at all. The distinction turns on what the offence is actually defined to punish. If an offence exists specifically to prevent a certain category of act, regardless of whether it causes harm to the person consenting, then that offence's own definition stands untouched by Sections 25 to 27's consent principle, because consent only ever excused harm-based liability, not this independently defined wrong.
No. It excuses only liability for the harm caused to the consenting person. Where the same act is separately defined as an offence regardless of that harm, this section confirms that consent does not touch that independent basis for liability.
Whether the offence's own definition punishes the act regardless of the harm to the consenting person — that is, whether the act would still be an offence even setting aside that particular harm entirely.
Neither. It is a clarifying, boundary-setting provision that limits how far Sections 25, 26, and 27 reach; it does not itself create liability or provide a defence.