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Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Chapter XIX · Of Criminal Intimidation, Insult, Annoyance, Defamation, Etc.
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Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Section 351

Criminal Intimidation

Section 351 defines criminal intimidation — threatening another by any means with injury to his person, reputation or property (or to the person or reputation of someone he is interested in), with intent to cause alarm or to make him do or omit an act — and fixes the punishment. The general punishment is imprisonment of up to two years, or fine, or both; for the graver threats listed in sub-section (3) it is up to seven years, or fine, or both; and an anonymous threat carries a further term of up to two years. The section replaces IPC Sections 503, 506 and 507 with a single section, and in sub-section (1) adds the words “by any means” to the definition.

Please note: This page reflects our understanding of the law as of the date it was last reviewed. Parliament, the State Legislatures, and the courts continue to amend and interpret this law, and this page may not yet reflect the most recent change. Please verify the current text of the law independently, and consult a licensed advocate for advice on your own matter, before relying on this page.

Corresponding Provision Under Prior Law

Verified against the National Crime Records Bureau’s official BNS–IPC concordance (Sankalan Portal) and cross-checked directly against the bare text of both Acts. Section 351 carries no “Change” marker in the concordance, which lists each sub-section against its counterpart in one of three separate sections of the old Indian Penal Code, 1860. Two facts are stated together: structurally, three IPC sections (503, 506 and 507) are brought into this one section; and in substance, words have been added to the operative text of sub-section (1). Because a real change accompanies the structural change, Section 351 is classed as Substantively changed, and each row is labelled on its own text comparison. The concordance itself carries no marker of change against this section; the category rests on Lexovia’s own comparison of the texts:

BNS sectionIPC, 1860 equivalentCategory
351(1)S.503 “Criminal intimidation”Substantively changed
351(2), 351(3)S.506 “Punishment for criminal intimidation”Split (1→2)
351(4)S.507 “Criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication”Exact

Comparing the statutory texts word by word: 351(1) and IPC Section 503. The definition, the Explanation on the reputation of a deceased person, and the Illustration are the same in both Acts, with these differences: (i) BNS 351(1) reads “Whoever threatens another by any means, with any injury…”, and the words “by any means” are added — they do not appear in IPC Section 503; (ii) the word “Illustration” is followed by a full stop in the BNS text but not in the IPC copy consulted. 351(2), 351(3) and IPC Section 506. IPC Section 506 carried both punishments in one section; BNS splits it into sub-section (2) (up to two years, or fine, or both) and sub-section (3) (up to seven years, or fine, or both, where the threat is of a listed kind). The punishments and the list of threats are the same words, with these exceptions: a single letter; the closing punctuation of the first part (a semicolon in the IPC, a full stop in BNS sub-section (2)); and the join described below. In the list of threats, BNS 351(3) reads “…or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years”, whereas the copy of IPC Section 506 consulted reads “…of with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years”. The IPC text prints “of” where BNS 351(3) has “or”. The drafting also differs at the join (the IPC also prints a marginal sub-heading for this second part, “If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.”, which the BNS does not): IPC 506 continues “and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt…”, whereas BNS 351(3) begins “Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by threatening to cause death or grievous hurt…”. 351(4) and IPC Section 507. The anonymous-communication tier, its two-year term and the two limbs (anonymous communication; precaution to conceal name or abode) are the same. The closing words differ: IPC Section 507 ends “in addition to the punishment provided for the offence by the last preceding section” (the section immediately before it, IPC Section 506, which prescribed the punishment), while BNS 351(4) ends “in addition to the punishment provided for the offence under sub-section (1)”. In the BNS section, sub-section (1) is the defining sub-section, and the punishments are in sub-sections (2) and (3). Category: the section brings three IPC sections (503, 506 and 507) into one, and words have been added to the operative text of sub-section (1) (“by any means”), so the section is shown as Substantively changed, with both facts stated here. Row by row: 351(1) is Substantively changed, for the added words; 351(2) and 351(3) together are a Split (1→2) of IPC Section 506 into two sub-sections, with the ingredients and punishments carried over in the same words; 351(4) is Exact against IPC Section 507, the differences noted being in drafting and cross-references only.

Quick Reference

Sourced from the First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) and Section 359 of the BNSS. Sub-section (1) only defines criminal intimidation and carries no punishment of its own, so the First Schedule has no row for it; sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) each have their own row.

(2) — criminal intimidation: First Schedule wording: “Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both.” (the section itself provides imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or fine, or both) · Non-cognizable (a police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant — BNSS Section 2(1)(o)) · Bailable · compoundable by the person intimidated, without the court’s permission (first table of BNSS Section 359(1)) · triable by any Magistrate.

(3) — threat to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.: First Schedule wording: “Imprisonment for 7 years, or fine, or both.” (the section itself provides imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or fine, or both) · Non-cognizable · Bailable · compoundable by the person intimidated, without the court’s permission (first table of BNSS Section 359(1)) · triable by a Magistrate of the first class.

(4) — anonymous communication, or precaution to conceal name or abode: First Schedule wording: “Imprisonment for 2 years, in addition to the punishment under section 351(1).” (the section itself provides imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to the punishment provided for the offence under sub-section (1)) · Non-cognizable · Bailable · not compoundable (351(4) appears in neither compounding table of BNSS Section 359) · triable by a Magistrate of the first class.

Statutory Text (Verbatim)

(1) Whoever threatens another by any means, with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.

Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.

Illustration.
A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.

(2) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

(3) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by threatening to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

(4) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the person from whom the threat comes, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to the punishment provided for the offence under sub-section (1).

Source: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), as published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary.

Explanation & Illustration (Lexovia's Commentary — Not Statutory Text)

(1) Definition of criminal intimidation

Explanation (Lexovia's Commentary)

Sub-section (1) defines the offence and carries no punishment of its own. It has three parts. First, the accused threatens another, and the sub-section adds the words “by any means”, so the threat is not confined to spoken or written words. Second, the threat is of an injury to that person’s “person, reputation or property”, or to “the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested”; the threat can therefore concern someone other than the person threatened, if the person threatened is interested in that other person. Third, the threat is made with one of three intents: to cause alarm to the person threatened; or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do; or to cause that person to omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do. The closing words “as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat” follow the last two.

Two definitions in Section 2 bear on the wording. “Injury” is defined in Section 2(14) as any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property; sub-section (1) itself lists the threatened injury as being to “person, reputation or property”. And a person is “legally bound to do” whatever it is illegal in him to omit (Section 2(15)); “illegal” applies to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law or which furnishes ground for a civil action. The intent limbs are therefore measured against what the person threatened is, or is not, legally bound or entitled to do. The statutory Explanation extends the sub-section to a threat to injure the reputation of a deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested. The statutory Illustration, quoted above, is separate from this commentary and from the example below.

The sub-section is framed by intent. It speaks of “intent to cause alarm” or to cause an act or omission, and it does not say that the person threatened must actually have been alarmed, or must actually have done or omitted the act. It also does not require that any property be delivered. That is what separates criminal intimidation from extortion in Section 308(1), which requires that the accused intentionally puts a person in fear of injury and thereby dishonestly induces that person to deliver property, a valuable security, or something signed or sealed that may be converted into a valuable security. Section 308(3) separately punishes putting a person in fear of injury in order to commit extortion. It also differs from Section 354, which concerns causing a person to act or omit by inducing a belief that he will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 351 then set out the punishments for the offence defined here.

Illustration (Lexovia's Own Example)
Anita sits on the managing committee of her housing society and has filed an objection to a fee increase proposed by the treasurer, Dinesh. Before the meeting, Dinesh tells her, “Withdraw your objection. If you do not, I will put around false and damaging stories about your late father’s business dealings in the whole building.” Anita is legally entitled to press her objection, and Dinesh has threatened an injury to the reputation of a deceased person in whom she is interested, intending to make her omit to do an act which she is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of the threat. That is criminal intimidation within sub-section (1), through the reputation limb and the Explanation on a deceased person. The alarm limb would apply equally if Dinesh’s intent were only to frighten her.

(2) General punishment for criminal intimidation

Explanation (Lexovia's Commentary)

Sub-section (2) is the basic punishment provision for the offence defined in sub-section (1): “Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both”. It applies to the offence in general. Where the threat is of one of the kinds listed in sub-section (3), the longer term in that sub-section is the one prescribed for it, and where the threat is anonymous, sub-section (4) adds a further term. The sub-section fixes no amount for the fine, and the imprisonment may be of either description (simple or rigorous).

The word “offence” here has the meaning given by Section 2(24): a thing made punishable by the Sanhita, subject to the exceptions listed in that clause, none of which names Section 351. Sub-section (3) prescribes a longer term for threats of the listed kinds; sub-section (2) is the general punishment provision. A threat to injure a person’s reputation, or to damage his property otherwise than by fire, for example, is not one of the listed kinds unless the threatened act is itself an offence of the gravity the sub-section describes.

In the BNSS First Schedule the row for Section 351(2) classifies the offence as non-cognizable and bailable, triable by any Magistrate. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 351 are listed together in the first table of BNSS Section 359(1), which allows compounding by the person intimidated, without the permission of the court. The sub-section corresponds to the first part of IPC Section 506, whose punishment for the general case was the same: imprisonment of either description for up to two years, or fine, or both.

Illustration (Lexovia's Own Example)
Tara sells sweets from a stall on the same street as her competitor Vimal. She tells him, “Close your stall by Friday, or I will post on social media that your sweets are made with rotten khoya, and see who buys from you after that.” Tara knows that the claim about rotten khoya is untrue. Vimal is entitled to run his stall. Tara has threatened an injury to his reputation, intending to make him omit an act he is legally entitled to do, so she commits criminal intimidation. Her threat is only to publish a false and damaging claim about his business. It is not a threat to cause death or grievous hurt, to burn property, or to impute unchastity to a woman. The act she threatens is publication of a false and damaging claim, which is the kind of conduct Section 356 (defamation) deals with, and the term under that section is simple imprisonment of up to two years, or fine, or both, or community service, so it is not an offence of the seven-year kind described in sub-section (3). The threat is made to his face, so sub-section (4) is not engaged. On these facts the punishment is under sub-section (2).

(3) Threats of death, grievous hurt, fire, serious offences, or imputing unchastity

Explanation (Lexovia's Commentary)

Sub-section (3) prescribes a higher punishment where the criminal intimidation consists of a threat of one of the kinds it lists. The listed threats are: (i) to cause death; (ii) to cause grievous hurt; (iii) to cause the destruction of any property by fire; (iv) to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; (v) to cause an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years; and (vi) to impute unchastity to a woman. Each is an alternative, and the punishment is imprisonment of either description for up to seven years, or fine, or both. It is not a requirement of this sub-section that the threat be carried out; like sub-section (1), it is about the threat.

A few of the terms need care. “Grievous hurt” is the kind of hurt designated as grievous in Section 116, which lists eight kinds (emasculation; permanent privation of the sight of either eye; permanent privation of the hearing of either ear; privation of any member or joint; destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; permanent disfiguration of the head or face; fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; and any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of fifteen days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits). Item (iii) speaks of the destruction of property by fire, and item (iv) and item (v) are worded by reference to the punishment attached to the threatened offence, so one must look at the punishment prescribed for the offence that was threatened. “Woman” is defined in Section 2(35) as a female human being of any age. The sub-section speaks of “impute unchastity to a woman”, and so covers the threat of making such an imputation.

In the BNSS First Schedule the row for Section 351(3) (described as “If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.”) classifies the offence as non-cognizable and bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the first class. It is compoundable by the person intimidated without the court’s permission (the first table of BNSS Section 359(1) lists Sections 351(2) and 351(3) together). The list of threats and the seven-year term are the same as in the second part of IPC Section 506.

Illustration (Lexovia's Own Example)
Nikhil has lodged a complaint against Priya’s brother with the police and Priya is the main witness. Nikhil sends Priya a message that reads, “Tell the police you made a mistake, or your brother will be killed before the month is out.” He has threatened another (Priya) by an electronic message with an injury to the person of someone in whom she is interested, intending to cause her to do an act which she is not legally bound to do (to tell the police that she had made a mistake). Because the threat is to cause death, the punishment falls within sub-section (3) (up to seven years, or fine, or both) and not merely sub-section (2). The message carries Nikhil’s own name and number, so the anonymity provision of sub-section (4) is not in play.

(4) Anonymous communication, or precaution to conceal the sender

Explanation (Lexovia's Commentary)

Sub-section (4) adds a further punishment where the criminal intimidation is committed in one of two ways: (i) by an anonymous communication; or (ii) “having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the person from whom the threat comes”. The two limbs are alternatives. The punishment is imprisonment of either description for up to two years, and it is stated to be “in addition to the punishment provided for the offence under sub-section (1)”. Section 2 does not define “anonymous communication” or “communication”; this page uses the words in their everyday sense. The second limb is worded by reference to precautions taken to conceal a name or an abode, which is a separate ground from the message being anonymous.

A point on the wording is worth stating plainly. Sub-section (4) refers to the punishment provided for the offence “under sub-section (1)”. As printed, sub-section (1) is the sub-section that defines criminal intimidation, and the punishments for it are in sub-sections (2) and (3). The old provision, IPC Section 507, referred to “the last preceding section”, that is, the section carrying the punishment (IPC Section 506). The BNSS First Schedule row for Section 351(4) repeats the words “in addition to the punishment under section 351(1)”. The reader should read sub-section (4) together with sub-sections (2) and (3), and take advice on how the additional term applies to a particular case.

In the BNSS First Schedule the row for Section 351(4) classifies the offence as non-cognizable and bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the first class. Unlike sub-sections (2) and (3), which are listed in the first table of BNSS Section 359(1), Section 351(4) appears in neither compounding table, so it is not compoundable. The term of up to two years is the same as in IPC Section 507.

Illustration (Lexovia's Own Example)
Kabir is angry with Latha, a school principal, over a transfer decision. He sends her an unsigned typed letter, posted in a plain envelope with no return address, that says: “Resign from the school board by the end of the month, or every parent will receive copies of the false accusations I have written about you.” He has threatened an injury to her reputation, intending to make her omit an act (continuing on the board) that she is legally entitled to do, which is criminal intimidation under sub-section (1). Because the threat comes by an anonymous communication, and he has taken care to hide his name and address, sub-section (4) also applies to him: a further term of up to two years is provided in addition to the punishment for the offence.
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Judgment(s) Applicable to This Section (Lexovia's Commentary — Quoted Paragraphs Verbatim)

These judgment(s) relate to Section 351 as a whole rather than to one specific sub-section, and so are presented together here rather than alongside a particular clause above.

Beri Manoj v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14741 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India, decided 20 January 2026, Aravind Kumar & Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.)

Quoted Paragraphs (Verbatim)
Para No. 6
“… Even otherwise, mere expression of words, without any intention to cause alarm cannot amount to criminal intimidation.”
Para No. 7
“… prosecution of a person for criminal intimidation requires clear intention to cause alarm, irrespective of whether the victim was alarmed or not. … Vague allegations unsupported by prima facie cogent evidence cannot constitute offence indicated under Section 506 of the IPC. Last but not the least, the mere presence of a lawyer (appellant in the instant case) in his capacity of discharging professional duty of either giving advice or suggestion cannot amount to intimidation …”
What This Judgment Means (Lexovia's Commentary)

This case arose from a sensitive underlying matter, a prosecution under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act against other accused. The appellant, a lawyer, was named in the charge-sheet, and the main charge against him was criminal intimidation (old Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code). It rested on a statement the victim gave to a Magistrate about a week after the incident, in which she alleged that an uncle and two aunts of the main accused had threatened her to make her support him; her earlier statement to the police had not mentioned any threat by the appellant. The High Court refused to quash the case, treating it as a triable issue.

The Supreme Court quashed the proceedings against the appellant alone; the case continues against the others. It held that the allegation, a vague reference to “an uncle” that surfaced only after seven days, did not show the clear intention to cause alarm which criminal intimidation requires, and that mere words without an intention to cause alarm are not enough. It also held that a lawyer’s mere presence while giving professional advice or suggestions cannot amount to intimidation. Old Section 506 is now Section 351 of the Sanhita.

Currency check: decided January 2026, applying and reaffirming Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604 and Sharif Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2024) 14 SCC 122; no overruling found in this review.

Source: copy of the judgment obtained from the Supreme Court of India's official website.

Related / Cross-Referenced Sections

FAQs

What is the punishment for criminal intimidation under BNS Section 351?

Under sub-section (2), imprisonment of either description for up to two years, or fine, or both. Under sub-section (3), where the threat is to cause death or grievous hurt, destruction of property by fire, an offence punishable with death, life imprisonment or up to seven years’ imprisonment, or to impute unchastity to a woman, imprisonment of up to seven years, or fine, or both. Under sub-section (4), an anonymous threat carries a further term of up to two years.

Is criminal intimidation bailable, and which court tries it?

Under the First Schedule to the BNSS, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) are all non-cognizable and bailable. Sub-section (2) is triable by any Magistrate; sub-sections (3) and (4) by a Magistrate of the first class. Sub-sections (2) and (3) are compoundable by the person intimidated; sub-section (4) is not compoundable.

Does the threat have to be spoken, or made in person?

Sub-section (1) says the accused “threatens another by any means”. It does not confine the threat to any form, so a written note, a message or another means can be enough.

Is a threat directed at someone other than the person threatened covered?

Sub-section (1) covers a threat of injury “to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested”. The Explanation adds a threat to injure the reputation of a deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested.

Do I need to have actually carried out the threat, or to have frightened the person?

The sub-section is framed by intent — intent to cause alarm, or to cause an act or omission — and does not say that the person must in fact be alarmed or must in fact do or omit anything. Whether the required intent is shown depends on the facts of the case.

How is criminal intimidation different from extortion?

Extortion (Section 308) requires that the accused intentionally puts a person in fear of injury and thereby dishonestly induces that person to deliver property or a valuable security or something signed or sealed. Criminal intimidation under Section 351 does not require any delivery of property.

What has changed from IPC Sections 503, 506 and 507?

Three IPC sections have been brought into one. The punishments are the same. The one addition to the operative words is “by any means” in sub-section (1). Sub-section (4)’s closing cross-reference now reads “under sub-section (1)” where IPC Section 507 read “by the last preceding section”. The concordance section above also notes a one-letter difference in the IPC copy consulted (“of” where the BNS reads “or” in the list of threats).

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