Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Section 37

Acts Against Which There Is No Right of Private Defence

Section 37 sets the outer boundaries of the right of private defence described in Section 35. Sub- section (1) lists three situations in which the right does not exist at all — acts by, or by the direction of, a public servant acting in good faith that do not reasonably threaten death or grievous hurt, and situations where there was time to seek the protection of public authorities instead. Sub-section (2) then caps the right in every case: it never extends to inflicting more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence.

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Corresponding Provision Under Prior Law

Verified against the National Crime Records Bureau's official BNS–IPC concordance (Sankalan Portal) and cross-checked directly against the bare text of both Acts. Section 37 is marked Exact correspondence:

BNS 37	Covers	IPC, 1860 equivalent	Category
37	Acts against which there is no right of private defence	S.99 (identical substance, same section, including its own "extent of the right" paragraph and both Explanations)	Exact

Comparing the bare text directly, BNS Section 37 reproduces old IPC Section 99 in full — including the necessity-limitation paragraph and both numbered Explanations, which were part of the very same IPC section — without substantive change. The only difference is structural formatting: IPC 99 expressed its three "no right of private defence" situations and its harm-limit rule as continuous unlettered paragraphs; BNS 37 reformats these into numbered sub-section (1) with lettered clauses (a), (b), (c), and a separate numbered sub-section (2) — the same kind of reformatting-only change already seen at Sections 28 and 35.

Quick Reference

Section 37 is a General Exception — it defines the outer limits of the right of private defence, not itself a stand-alone offence. It carries no BNSS First Schedule entry and no cognizable/bailable/compoundable/triable-court classification of its own.

Sub-section (1) — when the right does not exist at all: against a public servant's own act (clause (a)), or an act done under a public servant's direction (clause (b)), done in good faith under colour of office and not reasonably threatening death or grievous hurt; and in any case where there was time to seek the protection of the public authorities instead (clause (c)).
Sub-section (2) — the universal necessity cap: even where the right does exist, it never permits inflicting more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence.
Two built-in safeguards (Explanations 1 and 2): the public-servant exclusion in clauses (a) and (b) does not strip a person of the right unless they knew, or had reason to believe, that the person acting (or directing the act) was in fact a public servant acting as such, or unless the required authority was stated or produced when demanded.
Effect where sub-section (1) applies: there is no right of private defence at all in that situation, whatever the underlying threat. Effect of sub-section (2): even a genuine exercise of the right becomes excessive, and loses the exception's protection, once it goes beyond what defence actually required.

Statutory Text (Verbatim)

(1) There is no right of private defence—

(a) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law;

(b) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law;

(2) The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.

Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.

Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, if demanded.

Source: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), as published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary.

Explanation & Illustration (Lexovia's Commentary — Not Statutory Text)

Sub-section (1) — Three situations where the right simply does not exist

Explanation (Lexovia's Commentary)

Clauses (a) and (b) carve out a narrow but important exception: a citizen cannot exercise the right of private defence against a public servant's own act, or an act done under such a public servant's direction, if it is done in good faith under colour of office and does not reasonably threaten death or grievous hurt — even if that act later turns out not to be strictly justifiable by law. The idea is to prevent citizens from violently resisting officials who are acting in apparent good faith within the scope of their duties, reserving legal channels (appeal, complaint, or court) for correcting any overreach, so long as the immediate threat does not rise to death or grievous hurt. Explanations 1 and 2, quoted above, add an important safeguard: this exclusion only applies if the person knew, or had reason to believe, that the person acting (or directing the act) was genuinely a public servant acting as such, or was told or shown the relevant authority when demanded — someone who reasonably has no idea they are dealing with an official is not deprived of the right. Clause (c) applies more broadly, beyond public servants: wherever there was genuinely time to seek help from the police or other public authorities instead of resorting to self-help, the right of private defence does not arise, because the entire justification for the right is the absence of any such opportunity.

Illustration (Lexovia's Own Example)

A tax official, wearing identification and acting under a genuine belief that a shop is violating tax rules, orders certain goods to be seized, even though the seizure later turns out not to be strictly authorized by law. The shopkeeper, who saw the official's identification and understood the person acting was a tax official carrying out their duties, resists violently and injures the official, even though the seizure created no reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Because the shopkeeper knew the person was a public servant acting in good faith under colour of office, and the act did not threaten death or grievous hurt, Section 37(1)(a) means the shopkeeper has no right of private defence here, whatever the eventual legality of the seizure.

Sub-section (2) — The universal cap: never more harm than necessary

Explanation (Lexovia's Commentary)

Unlike sub-section (1), which describes situations where the right does not exist at all, sub-section (2) applies universally, across every genuine exercise of the right of private defence: even where the right clearly exists, it is not unlimited. It never extends to inflicting more harm than is actually necessary to achieve the defensive purpose. This proportionality requirement means that once the threat has been neutralized, or once a lesser response would plainly have sufficed, any additional harm inflicted falls outside the protection of the right, however legitimate the initial defensive response may have been.

Illustration (Lexovia's Own Example)

An attacker swings a fist at a person, who blocks the blow and pushes the attacker to the ground, immediately ending the confrontation as the attacker lies subdued and poses no further threat. The person then continues to strike the now-subdued attacker repeatedly, causing serious injury well beyond what was needed to stop the original attack. While the initial block and push were within the right of private defence, the continued striking of a subdued, no-longer-threatening attacker inflicts more harm than necessary for the purpose of defence, and Section 37(2) removes the exception's protection for that excessive continuation.

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Related / Cross-Referenced Sections

FAQs

Does the public-servant exclusion apply even if the official's act turns out to be unlawful?

Yes, per the statute's own wording — the exclusion applies so long as the act was done in good faith under colour of office and did not reasonably threaten death or grievous hurt, even if the act may not be strictly justifiable by law.

What if a person genuinely did not know they were dealing with a public servant?

Explanations 1 and 2 preserve the right of private defence in that situation — the exclusion applies only if the person knew, or had reason to believe, that the person acting was a public servant (or acting on one's direction), or was shown the relevant authority when demanded.

Can excessive force ever be excused as private defence?

No. Sub-section (2) caps the right in every case — it never extends to inflicting more harm than necessary for the purpose of defence, regardless of how the confrontation began.