Section 51 addresses what happens when the act actually done differs from the act that was abetted: the abettor remains liable for the act actually done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had directly abetted it, provided that act was a probable consequence of the abetment and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
Verified against the National Crime Records Bureau's official BNS–IPC concordance (Sankalan Portal) and cross-checked directly against the bare text of both Acts. Section 51 is marked Substantively changed (words added to the proviso):
| BNS 51 | Covers | IPC, 1860 equivalent | Category |
|---|---|---|---|
| 51 | Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done | S.111 (same rule and illustrations; proviso adds “was abetted and”) | Substantively changed |
Comparing the bare text directly, BNS Section 51's main rule and all three illustrations reproduce old IPC Section 111 word-for-word. The difference is in the proviso, which adds words to the statute itself. The IPC proviso required that the act done "was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment." The BNS proviso reads "was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was abetted and committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment." The added words "was abetted and" mean the BNS text requires that the act done was itself abetted as well as committed under that influence, which the IPC text did not state. A separate, drafting-level difference: "Provided that" replaces "Provided" (the same kind of trivial addition already seen at Section 32).
When an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it:
Provided that the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was abetted and committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
Illustrations.
(a) A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into the food of Y, which is by the side of that of Z. Here, if the child was acting under the influence of A’s instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the child to put the poison into the food of Y.
(b) A instigates B to burn Z’s house, B sets fire to the house and at the same time commits theft of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house, is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning.
(c) A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the purpose of robbery, and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C break into the house, and being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder.
Source: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), as published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary.
Real-world abetment often does not play out exactly as planned: the person instigated may make a mistake, act on the plan in a slightly different way, or cause consequences beyond what was originally discussed. This section addresses precisely that gap between what was abetted and what actually happened. Its core test is whether the act actually done was a probable consequence of the abetment — that is, a reasonably foreseeable outcome flowing from the instigation, conspiracy, or aid — rather than a genuinely separate and independent act. Where that test is met, the abettor bears full liability for the act actually done, exactly as if they had abetted that specific outcome from the start; this is illustrated by the statute's own illustration (a), where a child's mistaken poisoning of the wrong victim still fell within the probable consequences of the instigation. Where the act done is instead a distinct, independent wrongdoing unconnected to what was likely to follow — illustration (b)'s example of an opportunistic theft committed alongside an abetted arson — the abettor is not liable for that separate act, only for what they actually abetted. Illustration (c) extends the same probable-consequence logic to situations involving multiple principal offenders and a more serious ultimate outcome (murder arising from an abetted robbery), showing that the test applies regardless of how many people carried out the abetted plan or how much more serious the resulting harm turned out to be, so long as it remained a probable consequence of what was abetted.
No. Liability under this section requires that the different act actually done was a probable consequence of the abetment; a genuinely distinct, unconnected act (as in illustration (b)) does not trigger liability under this section.
Not necessarily, per illustration (a) — where the mistaken act remains a probable consequence of the abetment and is done under its influence, the abettor remains liable.
Yes, per illustration (c) — the probable-consequence test applies regardless of how many principal offenders were involved in carrying out the abetted act.